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Q000016 quantal response equilibrium
A quantal response specifies choice probabilities that are smooth, increasing
functions of expected payoffs. A quantal response equilibrium has the prop-
erty that the choice distributions match the belief distributions used to cal-
culate expected payoffs. This stochastic generalization of the Nash
equilibrium provides strong empirical restrictions that are generally consist-
ent with data from laboratory experiments with human subjects. We define
the concept of regular quantal response equilibrium and discuss several ap-
plications from the recent literature.
Economic theory relies extensively on the assumption of perfect rationality,
which makes it possible to construct general models with strong (and some-
times surprising) predictions. The evaluation of these models using field data
requires the incorporation of random errors representing unobserved and
omitted elements, measurement error, and so on. Evaluation of these models
using data from laboratory experiments also requires an error structure,
since choice behaviour in the laboratory is also noisy, showing clear mistakes
and inconsistencies over time.
Probabilistic choice models (for example, logit, probit) have long been
used to incorporate stochastic elements in to the analysis of individual de-
cisions, and the quantal response equilibrium (QRE) is the analogous way to
model games with noisy players. These probabilistic choice models are based
on quantal response functions, which have the intuitive feature that devi-
ations from optimal decisions are negatively correlated with the associated
costs. That is, individuals are more likely to select better choices than worse
choices, but do not necessarily succeed in selecting the very best choice.
Formally, a quantal response function maps the vector of expected payoffs
from available choices into a vector of choice probabilities that is monotone
in the expected payoffs.
In a strategic game environment, a player’s expected payoffs from different
strategies are determined by beliefs about other players’ actions, so beliefs
determine expected payoffs, which in turn, generate choice probabilities ac-
cording to some quantal response function. A QRE imposes the requirement
that the beliefs match the equilibrium choice probabilities. Thus, QRE re-
quires solving for a fixed point in the choice probabilities, analogous to the
Nash equilibrium.
In fact, QRE is a generalization of Nash equilibrium, which converges to
the Nash equilibrium as the quantal response functions become very steep,
and approximate best response functions. This approach provides a useful
theoretical framework for looking at comparative statics effects of parameter
changes that may not alter Nash predictions. The incorporation of random
elements also provides a foundation for standard statistical analysis of field
and laboratory data in game theoretic applications.
A motivating example: generalized matching pennies
Before providing general definitions, it is useful to begin with a simple two-
person matching pennies game in which the Row player chooses Top (T) or
Bottom (B) and the Column player chooses left (L) or right (R). Row wins a
penny (and Column loses a penny) if the outcome is (Top, Right) or (Bot-
tom, Left) and Column wins a penny otherwise. Thus Row’s expected payoff
for Top (UT) is a function of Column’s probability of choosing Right (pR),
which is easily calculated as UT (pR)=pR(1pR)=2pR1, and similarly, UB
(pR)=12pR, so the optimal decision is to choose Top if Column is more
likely to choose Right, that is, if pR4
1
2
. Column’s expected payoffs are com-
puted analogously, as a function of Row’s probability of choosing Top (pT).
Figure 1 illustrates the best response functions in the unit square of mixed
strategies in the game, with the y-axis representing the row player’s Top
choice probability and the x-axis representing the column player’s Right
choice. The best response for Row is indicated by the dark step function that
jumps from 0 to 1 at pR ¼ 12. Similarly, the Column player’s best response line
is the step function, shown in light grey, which crosses over from left to right
at a height of 1
2
.
Using the same figure, we can represent a quantal response function, which
smooths out the discontinuous best response function, reflecting the mon-
otone and continuous choice probability as a function of payoffs. Such a
quantal response function is illustrated by Row’s dark curved line that rises
smoothly from the bottom-left corner to the top-right corner. The probabi-
listic choice equals 1
2
exactly at the point where row player is indifferent
between Top and Bottom. A quantal response function is also drawn for
Column. The intersection of these two quantal response functions occurs in
the centre of the figure, and is the quantal response equilibrium, just as the
intersection of the sharp best response function at the same point is the Nash
equilibrium in mixed strategies (1
2
for each decision).
Now suppose that all payoffs stay the same except for the Top-Right
outcome, which gives Row a higher payoff of 9 and Column a payoff of 1
as before. The increase in Row’s Top-Right payoff shifts Row’s best response
line leftward, as indicated by the dashed line step function in the figure, and it
also shifts Row’s quantal response (smooth dashed line). The new Nash
equilibrium (dot at the intersection of the step functions) is still at pT=0.5,
whereas the new QRE is at a higher level pT=0.62. This intuitive ‘own
payoff’ effect contrasts with the Nash equilibrium prediction of no change in
Row’s choice probabilities (since they are determined by the requirement that
Column is indifferent). The own-payoff effect predicted by regular QRE
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Figure 1 Players’ best responses and quantal responses for a generalized matching
pennies game
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matching-pennies structure – for example, Ochs (1995), McKelvey, Palfrey
and Weber (2000), Goeree and Holt (2001), and Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey
(2003).
Definitions
Let G=(N, S1,y,Sn, p1,y, pn) be a normal-form game, where N={1,y,n}
is the set of players, Si={si1,y,siJ(i)} is player i’s set of strategies and
S=S1 y SN is the set of strategy profiles, and pi: Si-R is player i’s
payoff function. Furthermore, let Si=D
J(i) be the set of probability distri-
butions over Si. An element si e Si is a mixed-strategy, which is a mapping
from Si to Si, where si(si) is the probability that player i chooses pure-
strategy si. Let S=S1 y SN be the set of mixed-strategy profiles. Given
a mixed-strategy profile s e S, player i’s expected payoff is pi(s)=Ss e S p(s)
pi(s), where p(s)=P i e N si(si) is the probability distribution over pure-
strategy profiles induced by s.
Let Pij denote the probability that player i selects strategy j. Recall that the
main idea behind QRE is that strategies with higher expected payoffs are
more likely to be chosen, although the best strategy is not necessarily chosen
with probability 1. In other words, QRE replaces players’ strict rational
choice best-responses by smoothed best responses or quantal responses.
Definition 1 Pi: R
J(i)-DJ(i) is a regular quantal-response function if it sat-
isfies the following four axioms.
–Interiority: Pij(pi)40 for all j=1,y, J(i) and for all pi e R
J(i).
–Continuity: Pij(pi) is a continuously differentiable function for all pi e R
J(i).
–Responsiveness: qPij(pi)/qpij40 for all j=1,y, J(i) and for all pi e R
J(i).
–Monotonicity: pij4pik implies that Pij(pi)4Pik(pi) for all j, k=1,y, J(i).
These axioms are economically and intuitively compelling. Interiority en-
sures the model has full domain, that is, it is logically consistent with all
possible data-sets. This is important for empirical applications of the model.
Continuity is a technical restriction, which ensures that Pi is non-empty and
single-valued. Furthermore, it seems a natural assumption since arbitrarily
small changes in expected payoffs should not lead to jumps in choice prob-
abilities. Responsiveness requires that if the expected payoff of an action
increases, ceteris paribus, the choice probability must also increase. Mono-
tonicity is a weak form of rational choice that involves binary comparisons
of actions: an action with higher expected payoff is chosen more frequently
than an action with a lower expected payoff.
Define P(p)=(P1(p1),y, Pn(pn)) to be regular if each Pi satisfies the above
regularity axioms. Since P(p) e S and p=p(s) is defined for any s e S, P J s
defines a mapping from S into itself.
Definition 2 Let P be regular. A regular quantal response equilibrium of the
normal-form game G is a mixed-strategy profile s such that s=P(s).
Since regularity of P includes continuity, P J s is a continuous mapping.
Existence of a regular QRE therefore follows directly from Brouwer’s fixed-
point theorem.
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Theorem There exists a regular quantal response equilibrium of G for any
regular P.
Empirical implications of regular QRE
The axioms underlying regular QRE collectively have strong empirical im-
plications, even without any parametric assumptions on P. To illustrate the
nature of these restrictions, consider again the generalized matching-pennies
game, where Row’s payoff is X when the outcome is (top, right). If X41, it is
readily verified that Row’s expected payoff of choosing ‘top’ is higher than of
choosing ‘bottom’ when pRo2/(X+3) (pR42/(X+3)). Monotonicity there-
fore implies that, if (pR
, pT
) defines a regular QRE, it must satisfy the
inequalities: pT  12 if pRZ2/(X+3) and vice versa. Likewise, Column’s ex-
pected payoff of choosing ‘right’ is higher (lower) than of choosing ‘left’
when pTo12ðpT412Þ. Thus (pR, pT) must satisfy pR  12 if pT  12, and vice
versa. The region defined by these inequalities defines the set of possible
regular QRE. For the specific case of X=9, this area is shown by the dark
gray shaded area in Figure 2. The three black dots show the Nash equilibria
for X=9 (left), X=1 (centre) and X=0 (right).
The case 1oXo1 can be analysed in a similar way. The set of regular
QRE for X=0, for instance, is given by the light shaded area in Figure 2.
Note that the Row player is predicted to choose ‘top’ more often than ‘bot-
tom’ in any regular QRE when X41, while the reverse is true for Xo1. In
fact, the responsiveness axiom can be used to show that if Row’s payoff of
the (top, right) outcome rises, Row’s probability of choosing ‘top’ increases.
Proposition (Goeree, Holt and Palfrey, 2005). In any regular QRE of the
asymmetric matching pennies game, Row’s probability of choosing Top is
























Figure 2 QRE Sets for generalized matching pennies with X=9 (dark) and X=0
(light)
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Quantal response equilibrium: a structural definition
The original definition of QRE (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995) adopts an
approach in the spirit of Harsanyi (1973) and McFadden (1974) whereby the
choice probabilities are rationalized by privately observed, mean zero ran-
dom disturbances to the expected payoffs. These disturbances are assumed to
be private information to the players, thereby converting the original game
into special kind of game of incomplete information. Any Bayesian equi-
librium of this disturbed game is a QRE of the underlying game. The quantal
response function generating the QRE is determined by the probability dis-
tribution of the random payoff disturbances.
Thus a smoothed response line can be interpreted to be the (inverse) dis-
tribution function of the differences between the disturbances, which has a
value of 1
2
when the expected payoffs are equal. For example, if the distur-
bances are i.i.d. and normally distributed, then the quantal response func-
tions will take the shape of a ‘probit’ curve, while if the i.i.d. disturbances are
distributed according to an extreme value distribution, the quantal response
functions will have a logistic form. For example, the logit QRE for the
generalized matching pennies game is a pair of probabilities that solve:
pT ¼
exp l½ðX þ 1ÞpR  1
 
exp l½ðX þ 1ÞpR  1
 þ exp l½1 2pR
  ;
pR ¼
exp l½1 2pT 
 
exp l½1 2pT 
 þ exp l½2pT  1
 
where the numerators are exponential functions of the expected payoffs for
the corresponding decision (T or R), and the denominators are normalizing
factors that force probabilities to sum to 1. As the logit precision parameter l
increases, the response functions become more responsive to payoff differ-
ences, and the logit response functions converge to the sharp step functions
shown in Figure 1.
The disturbances in the structural approach to QRE can be interpreted in
several ways. One possibility is to interpret them literally. That is, one views
the underlying game as simply a model of the average game being played,
with each actual game player being a mean zero perturbation of the basic
game. With this view, one can think of the payoff disturbances as reflecting
the effects of unobservable components such as a player’s mood or percep-
tual variations. A second possibility is to think of the players as statisticians,
whose objective is to estimate the payoff of each strategy using some un-
known set of instruments to perform the estimation. For general abstract
games, a reasonable first cut is to suppose that their estimation errors are
unbiased. The players then choose the strategy with the highest estimated
expected payoffs, implicitly taking into account the fact that the other players
are also estimating payoffs with some error, with the resulting equilibrium
corresponding to QRE.
One can show that the quantal response function generated by i.i.d dis-
turbances will always have the continuity and monotonicity properties of
regular quantal response functions, and therefore will lead to regular QRE.
In particular, the comparative static result of the previous section holds for
the logit QRE (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1996). If disturbances are not i.i.d.,
however, non-monotonicities are possible. Haile, Hortacsu and Kosenok
(2006) use this observation to show that, without restrictions on the distur-
bances, structural QRE can explain any data. One way to avoid this problem
is to make the i.i.d. assumption or impose the weaker notion of interchange-
ability (Goeree, Holt and Palfrey, 2005). A second way to generate testable
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restrictions is to constrain the same structural assumptions to hold across
different data-sets, thereby generating comparative static predictions.
Another solution is to simply work directly with the regularity axioms of
Definition 1 – the resulting quantal response functions do impose empirical
restrictions on the data and do not inherit the unintuitive features of the
structural approach such as symmetry and strong substitutability. Symmetry
requires that the effect of an increase in strategy k’s payoff on the probability
of choosing strategy j is the same as the effect of an increase in strategy j’s
payoff on the probability of choosing strategy k. Strong substitutability im-
plies, among other things, that, if the payoff of strategy k rises, the prob-
ability of choosing any of the other strategies j6¼k falls.
Applications: quantal response equilibrium in normal-form games
In an individual choice problem, the addition of ‘noise’ spreads out the
distribution of decisions around the expected-payoff-maximizing decision. In
contrast, expected payoffs in a game depend on other players’ choice prob-
abilities, and this interactive element can magnify the effects of noise via
feedback effects. One notable example is a coordination game where each
person’s payoff is the minimum of all player’s efforts, minus a cost param-
eter, c, times a player’s own effort. If co1, any common effort level is a Nash
equilibrium, since a unilateral decrease below a common effort reduces the
minimum and saves the cost, for a net loss of 1c for each unit reduction in
effort. Conversely, a unilateral effort increase does not alter the minimum, so
the loss is c. Therefore, c affects the downward slopes of the expected
payoff function in each direction and, if there is any uncertainty about oth-
ers’ decisions, low values of c make effort increases less risky. It is not
surprising that reductions in the effort cost c tend to increase average efforts,
both in laboratory experiments with human subjects and in a quantal re-
sponse equilibrium with noisy behaviour (Anderson, Goeree and Holt,
2001). For the two-person coordination game experiments reported in Go-
eree and Holt, 2005a, a reduction in the effort cost parameter from 0.75 to
0.25 raised average effort levels from 126 to 159 in the final five rounds. With
payoffs in pennies and a precision parameter of 0.1, the logit QRE predic-
tions for this game are 126 and 154 for the high and low effort costs. Thus the
QRE tracks the strong behavioural response to the treatment change,
whereas the range of Nash equilibria – from 110 to 170 – is unaffected by this
change.
The Traveller’s Dilemma is another game where small amounts of noise
can have large effects. As in the coordination game, the payoffs depend on
the minimum of all decisions (‘claims’). This is a two-person ‘lost luggage’
problem, where the airline representative interprets unequal damage claims
as evidence that the high claimant is inflated unjustly. Each player earns the
minimum of the two claims, with a penalty of R subtracted from the payoff
for the high claimant and added to that of the low claimant. As with the
coordination game, claims must be in a specified interval, but in the Trav-
eller’s Dilemma the unique Nash equilibrium is the lowest possible claim in
this interval, irrespective of the magnitude of R, as long as the benefit R from
a reduction below a common claim is greater than the smallest permitted
claim reduction. In contrast, intuition suggests that claims will be high when
the penalty from having the higher claim is low. In the Capra et al. (1999)
experiment, reductions in the penalty parameter, R, induce dramatic in-
creases in claims, moving the average from near Nash levels for high values
of R to the opposite side of the range of feasible claims for low values of R.
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This strong treatment effect is tracked well by the quantal response equi-
librium with the same precision parameter that tracks other coordination
game data.
In addition to these applications, the QRE has been used to explain
‘anomalous’ behaviour in a wide variety of games, including signalling
games, centipede games, two-stage bargaining, and overbidding in auctions
(Goeree, Holt and Palfrey, 2002). In addition, the quantal response equi-
librium has proven to be quite useful in the analysis of data from political
science experiments: jury voting (Guarnaschelli, McKelvey and Palfrey,
2000), voter turnout (Levine and Palfrey, 2007), and behaviour in partici-
pation games (Goeree and Holt, 2005a; Cason and Van Lam, 2005).
Applications: quantal response equilibrium in extensive form
games
The QRE approach has also been developed for extensive form games
(McKelvey and Palfrey 1998), where the analysis in done using behavioural
strategies. In the extensive form QRE, players follow Bayes’ rule and cal-
culate expected continuation payoffs based on the QRE strategies of the
other players. Interiority implies that beliefs are uniquely defined at any
information set and for any QRE strategy profile. Therefore issues related to
belief-based refinements do not arise, and a quantal response version of
sequential rationality follows immediately. When quantal response functions
approach best response functions, then the limiting QRE of the extensive
form game will select a subset of the sequential equilibria of the underlying
game.
QRE in extensive form games will typically have different implied choice
probabilities than would obtain if the same quantal response function were
applied to the same game in its reduced normal form. This occurs for two
reasons. First, QRE is not immune to ‘reduction’ of equivalent strategies,
since duplicate strategies will generally change the quantal response choice
probabilities, for much the same reason as the ‘red bus – blue bus’ example in
discrete choice econometrics. Second, expected payoff differences are differ-
ent when one collapses an extensive form game into its normal form: with
behaviour strategies, expected payoffs are computed at the interim stage,
conditioning on previous actions in the game; in contrast, normal form
mixed strategies are calculated ex ante.
Summary
The quantal response equilibrium approach to the analysis of games has
proven to be a useful generalization of the Nash equilibrium, especially when
dealing with ‘noisy decisions’ made by boundedly rational players and by
subjects in experiments. It can be extended to allow for learning and cog-
nitive belief formation in one-shot games where learning is not possible. This
approach provides a coherent framework for analysing an otherwise bewil-
dering array of ‘biases’ and anomalies in economics.
Jacob K. Goeree, Charles A. Holt and Thomas R. Palfrey
quantal response equilibrium 7
We acknowledge financial support from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, the
National Science Foundation (SBR 0094800 and 0551014; SES 0450712 and
0214013), and the Dutch National Science Foundation (VICI 453.03.606).
Bibliography
Anderson, S.K., Goeree, J.K. and Holt, C.A. 2001. Minimum effort coordination
games: stochastic potential and the logit equilibrium. Games and Economic Be-
havior 34, 177–99.
Capra, C.M, Goeree, J.K., Gomez, R. and Holt, C.A. 1999. Anomalous behavior in a
traveler’s dilemma? American Economic Review 89, 678–90.
Cason, T.N. and Van Lam, M. 2005. Uncertainty and resistance to reform in lab-
oratory participation games. European Journal of Political Economy 21, 708–37.
Goeree, J.K. and Holt, C.A. 2001. Ten little treasures of game theory and ten intuitive
contradictions. American Economic Review 91, 1402–22.
Goeree, J.K. and Holt, C.A. 2005a. An experimental study of costly coordination.
Games and Economic Behavior 46, 281–94.
Goeree, J.K. and Holt, C.A. 2005b. An explanation of anomalous behavior in models
of political participation. American Political Science Review 99, 201–13.
Goeree, J.K., Holt, C.A. and Palfrey, T.R. 2002. Quantal response equilibrium and
overbidding in private-value auctions. Journal of Economic Theory 104, 247–72.
Goeree, J.K., Holt, C.A. and Palfrey, T.R. 2003. Risk averse behavior in asymmetric
matching pennies games. Games and Economic Behavior 45, 97–113.
Goeree, J.K., Holt, C.A. and Palfrey, T.R. 2005. Regular quantal response equilib-
rium. Experimental Economics 8, 347–67.
Guarnaschelli, S., McKelvey, R.D. and Palfrey, T.R. 2000. An experimental study of
jury decision rules. American Political Science Review 94, 407–23.
Haile, P., Hortacsu, A. and Kosenok, G. 2006. On the empirical content of quantal
response equilibrium. Working paper, Yale School of Management, Yale Uni-
versity.
Harsanyi, J. 1973. Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed
strategy equilibrium. International Journal of Game Theory 2, 1–23.
Levine, D. and Palfrey, T.R. 2007. The paradox of voter participation: an experi-
mental study. American Political Science Review 101, 143–58.
McFadden, D. 1974. Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior. In
Frontiers in Econometrics, ed. P. Zarembka. New York: Academic Press.
McKelvey, R.D. and Palfrey, T.R. 1995. Quantal response equilibrium for normal
form games. Games and Economic Behavior 10, 6–38.
McKelvey, R.D. and Palfrey, T.R. 1996. A statistical theory of equilibrium in games.
Japanese Economic Review 47, 186–209.
McKelvey, R.D. and Palfrey, T.R. 1998. Quantal response equilibrium for extensive
form games. Experimental Economics 1, 9–41.
McKelvey, R.D., Palfrey, T.R. and Weber, R. 2000. The effects of payoff magnitude
and heterogeneity on behavior in 2 2 games with a unique mixed-strategy equi-
librium. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 42, 523–48.
Ochs, J. 1995. Games with unique, mixed strategy equilibria: an experimental study.














quantal response equilibrium 9
